- We are late in the economic cycle in the US, China, UK, while Europe has large unaddressed internal imbalances
- EM has gone through an adjustment 2011-2016 and the reforming countries have a positive outlook, while others deteriorate
- The US/ UK credit super-cycle which started in the early 80s is coming to an end with Fed hikes, while the post WW2 institutional framework is increasingly irrelevant and the dysfunctionality is leading to reformist politicians taking power
- The rebalancing/ reform period will likely be ushered in via a mild-US recession, and last 20-30 years
- Main street will be favoured over wall street and wages will rise, squeezing corporate margins
- Senior credit is protected from margin squeezes by the equity, while equity/ stressed debt opportunities prevail in post downturn areas as they start to recover
- There are structural growth related opportunities in EM, excluding China which is yet to start its own rebalancing
Long
term structural cycles
There are
a number of long term structural cycle theories, whether Stauss-Howe
generational cycle theory (4 generations per cycle of 85-100 years,
with the current cycle having started in 1946 following the last
crisis period of WW1 to WW2) or Kondratiev waves (e.g. 25 year booms
followed by 25 year busts driven by economic change waves/ growth
engines, the most recent one driven by the IT boom in 90's and
noughties and China entering the global labour market in the early
90's).
Credit
cycles
Similarly
since we moved off the gold standard, effectively starting with the
Treaty of Versailles in 1919, it has allowed credit super cycles. The
first derived from the Treaty of Versailles which switched most of
the gold supply to the US (German war reparations and UK/ French war
debt payment) and created the roaring 20's in the US and then 30's
bust, while Europe went through instability from 1918 to the outbreak
of war in '39. The end of WW2 saw a new institutional framework based
around Bretton Woods for the west's monetary regime, which again
allowed a US credit cycle which busted with Nixon closing the gold
window in '71, the ensuing period of inflation eroded 90% of the
value of the USD and which ended with Volcker hiking interest rates
into the mid-teens to kill inflation. That credit cycle reset between
'71 and the early 80s then allowed Alan Greenspan to foster the
current 35 year global credit super-cycle; a super-cycle that busted
in 2008 and saw a policy response designed to reflate it.
The
post-2008 reflation efforts, mainly by the US and China via fiscal
and monetary stimulus, initially lifted all assets, but sequentially
the most peripheral
assets have crashed and the crashes are getting
closer to the core. With, in my view, the UK potentially as the next
downturn area.
The most
supported areas/ assets in this cycle up to now have been: US large
company earnings, US real estate, US high yield, Chinese SoE's,
Chinese fixed asset investment sectors and Chinese real estate.
Fed
policy and the beginning of political reforms
The Fed
has a legal mandate on Core PCE to achieve a 2% target and to support
full employment. The Fed doesnt use a financial/ asset market model
in its modelling.
There are
two important points to consider.
With U3
below the NAIRU estimates, the Fed is under pressure to 'normalize'
interest rate policy. The current
weakness in Core PCE is temporary and driven by
weakness in Autos, some areas of retail and industrial sectors that
have been affected by EM export weakness, a strong USD and the bust
in oil/ shale. After that weakness passes, the rest of the components
are in the 2-3% range and underpinned by upwards wage pressures.
As such
the Fed could end the year feeling as though they are behind the
curve and need 2-3% Fed funds in 2018.
The
second point is the political changes we are seeing, which are
associated with the fourth tuning of the Strauss-Howe generational
theory. Under the Strauss-Howe theory new political leaders emerge to
deal with the crisis that unfolds and part of this is reforming the
economic structure and the institutional framework. Both Trump
and Corbyn
are clear fourth turning crisis leaders, while the EU has its own set
of internal
dynamics to deal with.
Key
aspects of this rebalancing include pushing up wages as a percent of
GDP, monetizing/ inflating debt away, corporate margins falling and
defaults rising.
Essentially
a new set of economic winners will emerge, primarily wage earners but
also companies and assets that can do well from the new framework.
This is not a short term change, but rather a structural cycle, the
fourth turning is predicted to last 20-30 years. If the Fed sticks to
a -2% real 'neutral' interest rate policy, it will take a long time
for inflation to erode the real value of debt.
In my
opinion we are still in the third turning, although Neil Howe
believes the fourth turning started in 2008. Listening to Howe's
comments he primarily defines the turning points as being culturally
and politically triggered, which a few years later leads to the
financial/ market transition. We are seeing political and cultural
changes associated with the fourth turning now as the political
narrative has changed in the last year.
The
unravelling, third turning, is where the post WW2 institutional
framework becomes increasingly dysfunctional and increasingly
desperate measures are used to support it. If this started in 1997
with the Asian credit bust and then the post-2000 bust, basically the
start of Albert Edward's Ice Age theory, then we are currently 20
years into a 20-30 year third turning cycle. As such the third
turning could give way to the fourth turning at any time. I would
guess the next US recession or a Chinese monetary crisis could be the
trigger for the new phase from an economic standpoint.
So the
Fed is hiking to meet its dual mandate and its policies will be
appropriate for 'main street', but negative for asset markets,
although it will err on the side of caution and Yellen has
increasingly suggested that the new neutral interest rate was nominal
GDP -2%. Similarly the political impulse is for pro-wage policies
that will squeeze both corporate margins, push up discount rates for
asset markets and shrink the FIRE economy as a percent of GDP.
The US
has similar debt dynamics as the UK and both are seeing debt grow
3-3.5x faster than GDP. As the rebalancing takes place the demand
that credit creation put into the economy will disappear, which is
recessionary in the short term, and in the long term will squeeze the
prior structural winners.
From an
economic sectoral balance standpoint, the US consumer and government
have been running deficits, while corporates and the external sector
have run surpluses; these will reverse with corporates squeezed and
the US becoming a net exporter over the period. Policies such as BAT
taxes will support this sectoral restructuring.
Commercial
real estate under Trump, another comment on
where
we are now
Economic
summary
So it
seems clear to me that we are in a period of change and the changes
will take time, be done under economic and market stresses and you
need a completely different asset allocation framework to benefit
from the new opportunities.
Liquid
markets
Trading
strategies should benefit from the instability. Buy
and hold will be a disaster. EM macro has been
working, but DM macro, CTAs, long vol and dispersion should work well
over the next 5-10 years. Some forms of active risk premia should
work well, but selectivity and timing will be key.
Post
downturn areas are attractive. The equity is attractive if there is
growth and self help/ auto stabilizers, e.g. oil, shipping. Stressed
debt with a pull to par is better if the recovery is slow and margins
remain depressed, e.g. most stressed/ distressed opportunities in
Europe. Examples recently include Greece, Argentina where the post
default complications lasted for years and debt was the better asset
class vs equity. The next stress/ distress candidates are Puerto
Rico, Venezuela, and perhaps the UK if we have a recession now.
There are
structural growth opportunities in EM, but EM is a case of the good,
the bad and the ugly; so selectivity is key. China clearly has big
internal economic distributional problems and has a debt bubble to
work off, so I would generally avoid it and its second derivatives
such as Hong Kong and Macau.
Private
markets
Private
Equity
Equity
earnings are going to be squeezed in the west, so most private equity
is unattractive, as is commercial real estate as a second derivative
that also has other structural challenges.
Generally,
after the bust that is coming, there will be opportunities to buy
cheap, cash producing, asset backed equity in companies that have
pricing power and finance it with negative real interest rate debt.
In the
west you have to wait for the crash, however there are current
opportunities in post downturn areas: Energy, Mining, Shipping,
Greece and some Emerging Markets. If the UK goes into a recession due
to a housing downturn, austerity, real wage squeeze and no offset in
investment, then it should present many opportunities.
I think
the hurdle risk/ reward is a minimum of a 2x return with limited
downside for unleveraged private equity. More involved, risky or
leveraged situations call for more return.
Private credit
You want
to avoid primary high yield or speculative bridge loans in overheated
areas. London property developers are a good example; developers
borrowing money at 15% to redecorate a vastly overvalued house only
works in a bull market and will have high default rates as the market
turns down. Generic mid-market senior lending where yields are fairly
low and credit quality has deteriorated should be avoided. These
areas are swamped with capital and many of the underlying businesses
will struggle from here.
Instead
you want to pick off niche areas on an intelligent basis. I think
CLOs are attractive, I think there are senior lending opportunities
in shipping, energy, mining, clean energy/ clean technology lease
finance, some senior bank debt restructurings in Greece. There are
some infrastructure related opportunities.
There are
many senior opportunities in emerging markets, including India,
Moscow, I'm sure if you looked in Brazil or other large EMs you would
similarly find opportunities. I would avoid China and Hong Kong/
Macau. As an indicator, some residential real estate prices in
Singapore have fallen 45% since 2011, given the commodity bust in
Australia and Indonesia.
You can
hold the senior secured credit on a yield of up to L+9% or so for
very low risk debt. You could leverage this 2-3x if you want equity
like returns with senior credit underlying. Or you can do a higher
loan to value or some bridge situations and get teen yields,
unleveraged, in post downturn areas.
If US
nominal GDP growth now is circa 4.5% and that rises to 5-6% with some
moderate wage-inflation pressure and the Fed has to hike to 3-4% over
the next two years, yields should also rise in private credit in
areas not swamped by investor capital. A 3 year loan book should get
on average a 1/3rd principal and 10% interest receipt per
year, so you can manage the portfolio over time. Fed rates of 3-4% vs
2% real GDP growth with a lot of the inflation being wages squeezing
corporate margins is not going to be great for equity or the
valuations of equity. (corporate
profit falls in Q1)
There is
nowhere else in credit you will be able to beat 5-6% nominal GDP with
a comfortable margin and low default risks, even if there is a
moderate yield reset in high yield, its still low quality credit at a
time of rising defaults.
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